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DENNIS E. TEEGUARDEN* and DAVID THOMAS**

A Public Corporation Model for
Federal Forest Land Management
Congress has had numerous opportunities in recent years to reconsider
the present institutional arrangements under which the federal forest lands,
including the national forests, are owned and managed. For example,
Congress might have decided to terminate the experiment in public land
management, which began in 1891 when Congress gave the President
authority to set apart certain public lands as forest reservations,' and to
sell the forests to private parties or to transfer them to the states. Congress,
however, took the opposite approach not only once, but twice. First, in
the National Forest Management Act of 1976,2 Congress gave the National
Forest System statutory status by amending the Forest and Rangeland
Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974.' Congress stated that:
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of the Act of June 4, 1897.... no
land now or hereafter reserved or withdrawn from the public domain
as national forests pursuant to the Act of March 3, 1891 ...

or any

act supplementary to and amendatory thereof, shall be returned to
the public domain except by an act of Congress.4
Second, in the same year, 1976, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act' extended permanent federal ownership and management to
all federal lands, except where disposal in a specific instance serves the
national interest.
These expressions of congressional decision regarding the status of
entry on to public lands, however, far from resolve the issue of disposal
versus retention of public lands. Doubtless the debate will continue just
as it has for the past 200 years. Disposal or substantial transfer of forest
land to states likely will not enjoy much political favor. The whole history
of public land policy reflects incremental adjustments and changes of
policies which determine the way the land is managed and the methods
*Professor of Forestry and Chairman, Department of Forestry and Resource Management, University of California at Berkeley.
**Graduate student and former Research Assistant, University of California at Berkeley.
1. Forest Reserve Act of 1891, 51 Stat. 561, §24 (1891).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1609 (1982).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (1982).
4. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 9, 90 Stat. 2949, 2957
(1976).
5. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982).
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to provide private access to such resources as timber, grass, water, and
wilderness. At least by most observers, permanent federal ownership is
anticipated.
Still, new institutional structures for managing the public lands merit
development and evaluation. An example is the suggestion for the leasing
of public land with a pullback arrangement. 6 Under such a policy, a person
or group could apply for a long-term lease on a tract of federal land. Any
other person or group, however, could apply to pull back a part of the
lease area if it meets the same terms applicable to the original applicant.
Parties with competing interests in the same tracts of land, therefore,
would be forced to bargain directly with each other in gaining exclusive
rights to the use of the land for a specific period of years, rather than
each attempting to exert the greatest influence on a government agency.
A PUBLIC CORPORATION MODEL
In this article, yet another alternative will be outlined: the establishment
of independent public forest corporations (PFC) to manage federal forest
land resources. A PFC would function similarly to those public corporations which now manage public communications, transportation, and
electrical power generation facilities. 7 Each national forest, for example,
could be chartered to operate as a wholly governmentally-owned autonomous corporation' with a board of directors and administrative officers. 9
6. M. CLAWSON, ThE PuaLic LANDS REvisrrED, 200-24 (1983).
7. Federal government ownership and control of public corporations varies from regulated private
ownership to full government ownership:
a. The Communications Satellite Corporation (ComSat) was established by an Act of
Congress, 76 Stat. 423 (1962), which authorized incorporation under the District of
Columbia Business Corporation Act, 29 D.C. CODE ANN., §§ 29-201 to 379.50 (1981),
as a private corporation, but specified that 50% of its stock was reserved for purchase
by designated communications common carriers, 47 U.S.C. § 734(b) (1982), in an effort
to regulate the corporation by controlling its structure. See generally,Levin, Organization
and Control of Communications Satellites, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 315-57 (1965).
b. The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) receives investment capital
from the federal government as well as from private stockholders, 45 U.S.C. §§501658 (1982). A majority of the board of directors are appointed by the President, and the
charter reserves common stock for railroad companies, while preferred stock is only for
buyers who do not control railroads. 45 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1982).
c. Although navigation, flood control, power generation, and fertilizer facilities are
the main focus of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), this wholly government-owned
corporation is also authorized by its congressional charter, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1982), to
engage in a range of economic development and demonstration activities, which have
included wildlife habitat and recreation area development and management. See generally
Wirtz, The Legal Framework of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 43 TENN. L. REv. 573612 (1976).
8. The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 [P.L. 79-248] requires an Act of Congress
to charter any corporation in which the federal government has any direct ownership or control, and
codified basic rules for their organization, financing, auditing, and reporting. 31 U.S.C. §§ 841-70
(1982). See generally, Pritchett, The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 40 AM. POL.
Scd. REv. 495 (1946); and Seidman, The Theory of the Autonomous Government Corporation:A
CriticalAppraisal, 12 PuB. AD. REv. 89 (1952).
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Each PFC would have legal independence,' ° and a right to establish its
own timber production and other resource output goals in response to the
demand for its services and costs of producing them. Operations would
be self:financed through sales of products, services, and land-use leases.
Investment capital would be obtained, as in the case of private corporations, by the sale of securities 2 and by retained earnings."3 Services
that lack adequate profit margins or markets, but which yield significant
public benefits, could be assured through contractual arrangements in
which agencies of federal or state governments, or non-government organizations, pay the PFC for specified kinds and quantities of such services.
To assure some reasonable degree of uniformity in corporate structure,
operating policies, financial management, pricing policies, and resource
stewardship, a Public Corporations Board would be established to regulate
the National Forest Corporations. 4 This board, appointed to renewable
9. The role, competence, and accountability of board members, and thus in large measure the
effectiveness of the corporation, will relate to whether they are full-time or part-time and requirements
for background and experience. These and related factors should receive careful consideration in
formulation of corporate charters. See generally Schwartz, GovernmentallyAppointed Directors in
a Private Corporation-TheCommunications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HAtv. L. REv. 350 (1965);
Hobbs, PersonalLiability of Directors of FederalGovernment Corporations,30 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 733 (1980).
10. Including the right to enter into contracts, standing to sue and be sued, and top management
exempt from civil service regulations. A separate legal identity is common for government corporations. Hobbs, supra note 9, at 33-34.
11. Such independence from the regular governmental budgetary process is a well-established
principle for federal government corporations, but monitoring by the Bureau of the Budget, GAO,
and Congress is required under the Government Corporations Control Act. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
12. Government corporations financed at least in part by the sale of shares to the public or to
authorized investors, can raise investment capital by issuing common and preferred stock. See supra
note 7. The wholly government-owned example here, however, would be limited to the issue of
bonds yielding tax-exempt interest payments. Decisions to issue bonds and the timing of issue are
corporate decisions, but the form, denomination, maturities, and rates must be approved by the
Treasury Department. Although such bonds resemble moral obligation bonds, "the federal government is generally considered ultimately responsible for the obligations of the federal corporations."
A. WALSH, THE PUBLIc'S Busmtess: THE PoLrrICs AND PRACTICES OF PUBLIC CORPORATONs 285
(1978).
13. Other sources of investment capital for federal government corporations have included public
enterprise revolving funds (appropriations to which sometimes are not included in U.S. budget
totals), e.g., Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, Inter-American Foundation, Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, etc.; government-guaranteed loans (U.S. Railway Association); low-interest
government loans (Conrail, Panama Canal Company); U.S. Treasury credit subsidies (St. Lawrence
Seaway Corporation, Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation, etc.); and direct congressional
appropriations. See generally WALSH, supra note 12, at 34-36, Chart 2.1.
14. The alternative forms of organization to this model of separate National Forest Corporations
overseen by a national regulatory board, would include: (a) separate forest-level corporations which
set all their own policies; or (b) a single national forest management corporation with forest-level
operational units or wholly-owned subsidiaries. Amtrak has a wholly-owned subsidiary called the
Amtrak Commuter Services Corporation, authorized by Congress in 1981. 45 U.S.C. §§581-590
(1982).
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fixed terms of office by the President, with advice and consent of the
Sen'ate, would include persons from the business community and the
various user groups. 5 The board would set minimum profit and performance standards and seek to impose the minimum necessary policy constraints on corporate flexibility. The Public Corporations Board also would
hear and address grievances regarding unfair competition with the private
sector or unfair treatment of particular user groups.16
Congressional charters 7 to operate a tract of federal land 8 as a public
corporation could initially be made for specific periods of time, e.g., ten
to fifteen years. During that period of time, the corporation would have
to demonstrate its ability to meet minimum profit and performance standards. If the PFC failed to meet the standards, a corporation could be
merged with a more efficient unit, or dissolved. The land would be
returned to a federal agency charged with custodial management. If the
corporation succeeded and met the profit and performance standards, its
charter could be renewed indefinitely.
THE PRESENT SYSTEM
Before addressing the advantages and disadvantages of the public corporation model, a brief review of the present institutional arrangements
under which the federal lands are managed is appropriate.The major
characteristics of current federal land management follow:
1. The federal government has retained ownership of the land,
but private parties may make use of the land under terms established
by law or regulation.
2. The administration and management of the federal lands is a
multi-tiered, highly centralized bureaucratic organization of professional land managers and'political policymakers.
3. A complex, continuous planning and resource allocation process characterizes the administration and management of federal lands.
The lower level units, such as national forests, establish ranges of
15. Interest groups with representation specified on the board would include: federal government;
state government; local communities; timber industry; other business groups; and other user groups.
In establishing criteria for board membership, most of the effects of board composition mentioned
in note 9, supra, should also be considered.
16. The Public Corporations Board would seek to assure overall corporate management objectives
consistent with government participation. Minimum rates of return on new capital investment would
be set by the bond market, and the board would set a minimum overall average corporate rate of
return. Rather than seek only to maximize profits, however, once corporate returns are beyond the
minimum, management decisions would consider a set of wider social considerations under general
policies set by the Public Corporations Board.
17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
18. Through its capacity to enter into contracts as a corporate entity, the corporation could decide
to manage private land intermingled with national forest land, at negotiated terms which meet or
exceed the minimum rate of return on corporate resources.
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feasible outputs based on land capability, which are passed upward
through regional or state offices to the national level. The political
policy makers at the national level then establish goals and formulate
aggregate budgetary needs for congressional and presidential approval. Resource output targets and budgets are then disaggregated
downward to regions and to the forests. Although depicted here as
a sequential process, in practice the fiscal and resource management
of federal lands is reiterative and simultaneous. Negotiation occurs
among the several levels in an effort to identify programs that are
technically feasible, socially acceptable, and consistent with congressional and executive priorities.
4. Resource planning at the forest level is distinctly separated
from budgetary planning at the national level. Congress controls the
purse strings, including the level of new capital investment, while
the managing agency determines the resource outputs and land uses.
5. Financial and economic efficiency play only a minor role in
resource allocation decisions characterized by multi-objective management. Although assets worth many millions of dollars are involved, balance sheets which report the economic health of the federal
land operation are not maintained. As a result, it is impossible to
assess the degree to which the federal land management is being
subsidized or yielding a net gain to society.
6. The professional resource managers of federal lands, such as
foresters, range ecologists, and hydrologists, are moved from one
location to another and from one kind of responsibility to another as
they progress in their careers. Field level personnel rarely remain in
one forest for more than three or four years. As a result, continuity
in programs and results of experience must be passed on through
regulations, manuals, and plans.
The federal forest lands cannot be efficiently managed under the type
of hierarchical structure which now exists. The complex exchange of
information between levels, the difficulty of establishing output goals in
the absence of an agreed-upon objective and measure of performance,
and the geographically diverse nature of federal forest land management
are insurmountable obstacles to efficient management. Simply said, the
system is too large, too diversified, too complex to be fully understood
or managed by any single authority. The establishment of each forest as
an independent public corporation would simplify the management structure and promote greater efficiency, control, and accountability.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC CORPORATION
The U.S. industrial boom of the 1870s, described as the era of the
corporate revolution, was characterized by a transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy and the rapid growth of businesses which
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took advantage of the limited liability and pooled investment opportunities
offered by the corporate structure.' 9 Throughout the period, however, the
few government enterprises in existence were organized, financed, and
controlled like other government departments or bureaus, ignoring the
flexibility of the private corporate structure.2 ,
By World War I, certain types of the growing number of public enterprises were recognized as having distinguishing characteristics which
clearly set them apart from typical. government programs:
(1) the government [was] dealing with the public as a businessman
rather than a sovereign; (2) users, rather than the general taxpayer,
[were] to pay for the cost of goods and services; (3) expenditures
necessarily fluctuate[d] with consumer demand and [could] not be
predicted accurately [n]or realistically kept within annual limitations;
(4) expenditures to meet increased demand should not [have] in the
long run, increase[d] the net outlay from the treasury; and (5) operations [were] being conducted within areas in which there [were]
well established commercial trade practices. 2
It was evident that the operating and financial requirements of such
enterprises were incompatible with the existing administrative and financial structure of regular government agencies which included financing
through annual appropriations, very detailed procedural regulations, and
complex approval processes.
In response, theorists developed the concept of the autonomous government corporation as an alternative form of organizing public enterprises.' They visualized Congress acting as a holding corporation for a
series of distinct subsidiary public corporations, each with legal, administrative, and financial autonomy. Few traces remain of the first whollyowned government corporations established during World War I,' but
the New Deal/World War II era brought a second wave of public corporation establishment.24 The confusing array of governmental relationships and the occasional abuse of public corporations, however, conflicted
with the need to bring operations of public corporations into harmony
with related actions of the government, and to hold public corporations
accountable for their acts. 25
19. Seidman, supra note 8, at 89.
20. Seidman, The Government Corporation: Organization and Control, 14 PuB. AD. REV. 183
(1954) [hereinafter cited as The Government Corporation].
21. Id. at 183-84.
22. Pritchett, The Paradox of the Government Corporation, 1 PuB. AD. REV. 381 (1941).
23. Abel, The Public Corporation in the United States, THE PUBLIC CORPORATION: A COMPARATIVE
SYMpoSiuM 342 (W Friedman, ed. 1954).
24. Lilienthal & Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the Federal Government, 54
HARv. L. REv. 545 (1941). See also, J. McDIARMID, GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND FEDERAL
FUNDS (1938), Pritchett, supra note 22, and Friedman, A Comparative Analysis, THE PUBLIC CORPORATION: A COMPARATIVE SYMPOsiUM 541 (W. Friedman ed. 1954).
25. The Government Corporation, supra note 20, at 185.
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The objective sought through establishing public corporations was not
freedom from all governmental controls, but freedom from governmental
restrictions unsuited to a business operation which stifle efficient operations.26 The Government Corporation Control Act of 194527 granted the
government corporation freedom from the strict bureaucracy. This law
limited the method of establishing such enterprises to an Act of Congress
and provided for business-like budget, audit, other financial controls, and
reporting procedures. During the post-World War II era, extremes of
corporate autonomy continued to be attacked by the Hoover Commission,
as well as by those wary of the expanding role of government.28 Thus,
while Europe gained substantial experience and developed a literature on
public corporation economics and strategy,2 9 few new federal government
corporations were established in the United States until the 1960s. Since
then, several new public corporations have been established at the federal
level, as well as many others at the interstate, regional, and local level
throughout the country. A 1978 Twentieth Century Fund study of these
new corporations concluded that, despite a number of improvements that
could be made, "[s]table and talented executive leadership, internal emphasis on management improvement, performance incentives, and decentralized operations are the important characteristics of public [corporation]
administration that stand out in contrast with general government and
contribute significantly to the effectiveness of public [corporation] operations." 3 It appears then that an apropriate balance is being found
between corporate autonomy and government control.
The public corporation has thus become "[o]ne of the few popularly
acceptable forms for American government to engage in economic activities." 3' Public corporations, under the policy guidance of the government, "[p]rovide a relatively independent base of operations for
entrepreneurs in the public sector, providing managers with administrative
power that is greater than that usually found within the regular hierarchies
and bureaus of government." 3 2
Because they are widely regarded as business rather than as political
enterprises, public [corporations] have enjoyed support from groups
in nearly all positions on the political spectrum ...Not even the
severe critics of specific public [corporations] have been willing to
recommend that they be dismantled and their operations turned over
to regular government agencies.33
26. Seidman, supra note 8, at 94.
27. Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 89-248, 59 STAT. 597 (1945).
28. WALSH, supra note 12.
29. See, e.g., R. REES, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE ECONOMICS: INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC AND POUCY
DECISIONS (1976), and R. MAZZOLIN, GOVERNMEr CONTROLLEDr
ENTERPRISES (1979).
30. WALSH, supra note 12, at 336.
31. Id., at 3.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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The idea of a public corporation to manage forest land is not new. In
a report to the National Academy of Sciences, 34 a study team recommended the establishment of public corporations to function as Regional
Forest Management agencies which would be authorized to lease nonindustrial privately owned forest land. Subsequently, the concept was
carried a step further by a proposal to form public corporations which
would jointly manage federal land and adjoining leased private land in
specified forest management regions.35 The present proposal is a variant
on these earlier ideas.
AN ILLUSTRATION
To illustrate how a system for independent public corporations might
work, consider the National Forest System. Under the proposal, each
National Forest would become an independent public corporation, 36 operating under federal charter,37 which gives it legal authority to manage
federal land in much the same manner that other federal corporations
manage communications, transportation, or electrical generation facilities.38 The charter would give the corporation the right to establish its
own production goals, land uses, management intensities, and financial
arrangements, within the general policy constraints set by the Public
Corporations Board.39 For example, in the case of timber resources, the
corporation would be free to harvest standing timber on a schedule of its
own choosing, and to decide whether to sell standing timber or logs.
Similarly, the corporation would decide on how much and where to invest
in such forest management practices as planting, thinning, roads, and
forest protection, subject only to constraints on its capacity to raise the
necessary capital funds. The corporation would also have the legal right
to enter into contractual agreements, including legal standing to sue and
be sued, and thus have freedom to lease private land intermingled with
national forest land, if mutually agreeable terms could be negotiated.
To assure economic efficiency in making such decisions, the Public
Corporations Board would establish a minimum nominal percentage average rate of return, perhaps eight percent, to be earned on assets held
by each corporation.' This rate of return might vary and depends on the
34. National Academy of Sciences, Man, Materials,and Environment. A Report of the National
Commission on Materials Policy (1973).
35. Teeguarden, Forest Regulation XI." The Geographic Basis, 72(4) J. oF FoRsTRY 217-20
(1974).
36. With general policy regulation by the Public Corporations Board. See supra note 14.
37. See supra note 8.
38. See supra note 7. TVA would be the closest precedent available but without the general
economic development goals of TVA. See Wirtz, supra note 7.
39. See supra notes 10, 11, and 18 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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potential productivity of the land base. It might be higher, for example,
for a corporation operating on high site lands on the Pacific Coast than
for one operating in the Intermountain Region. To assure that timber
inventory is not liquidated, the corporation's charter would stipulate that
it maintain sufficient growing stock to utilize at least severty-five percent
of the potential site productivity.
The corporation would decide the level and mix of multiple uses of
the forest, such as grazing and outdoor recreation, and the fees, if any,
to charge for these services. Such decisions presumably would be made
with an eye to financial feasibility, i.e., the capacity of revenues to cover
costs and provide some minimum rate of return on invested capital,
without engaging in unfair competition with private enterprise through
abuse of monopoly power or tax advantages. 4' Extensive types of outdoor
recreation, however, would be continued for the sake of good public
relations and because the cost of providing such services would be less
than the costs of preventing such activities from occurring.
If public corporations were established, the management of wilderness
areas now included in the National Wilderness Preservation System could
be arranged in several alternative ways:
1. The corporation would be required to continue to administer
wilderness units pursuant to the Wilderness Act.42 The corporation
would also be permitted to (a) levy fees to cover the direct costs of
management; or (b) enter into specific agreement whereby the federal
government would provide funding on a cost-plus basis; or (c) use
funds from a revolving fund for wilderness management which is
replenished from a set percentage of corporate profits.
2. The corporation would be authorized to lease the management
of the area to a wilderness or outdoor recreation group which would
be responsible for paying all management costs.
3. Wilderness units would be transferred to the National Park
Service.
Obviously, a profit-oriented public corporation would not have incentive to provide the level and kind of nonmarket services that the public
has come to expect from a federal agency whose decisions are not disciplined by the competitive market place. Access to recreation, wilderness, or preservation of unique landscapes or ecological communities are
examples of public services that often are considereed difficult or impossible to supply in the private economy. One approach to assuring that
41. For a discussion of legal challenges to TVA's power pricing policies, see L.B. ScHwARTz &
J.J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES (FREE ENTERPRISE AND EcONOMIC ORGAN-

IZATION) 818-35 (1977).

42. 16 U.S.C. ss1131-1136 (1982).
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these services are provided, if judged to be necessary in the public interest,
is to have appropriate state or federal agencies or private conservation
groups enter into contractual agreements under which the public corporation is paid to provide specific services or to designate a particular area
for a particular use. For this to work, those who would have such services
provided must be willing to pay a price sufficient to induce the corporation
to give up the net returns associated with the alternate use. Such contractual arrangement would: (a) allow decisions about the type and amount
of taxpayers' subsidization to remain in the political arena; (b) provide
politicians with accounting data on the opportunity costs of such services;
and (c) provide an opportunity for people with a high willingness-to-pay
for such services to organize and contract for the provision of the services.
One funding source option would be for a designated percentage of
net corporate profits to be deposited into a wilderness management fund.
Such a fund could be managed at either the forest or the national level;
the percentage of profits payable into the fund would be designated by
the Public Corporations Board. This would give wilderness advocates an
interest in the economic success of the corporation, and would provide
a funding source for wilderness management which would be buffered
somewhat against the year-to-year fluctuations of congressional appropriations. This separate accounting would allow Congress to monitor
expenditures from the fund as an indicator of the cost of preservation and
the financial impact of expansion or contraction of wilderness and preservation areas.
Each corporation would be required to organize a system for reporting
revenues, costs, capital investments and recovery, profits, and the usual
measures of financial health normally required of any private corporation.43 Corporations would be subject to audit by the General Accounting
Office, and would make an annual submission to Congress.' But rather
than being dependent on the Congress for annual appropriations for new
investments and operations, the corporation would finance its own operations from the sale of services, retained earnings, recovery of capital
from old investments, and issue of securities such as tax-free bonds.45
The corporation might also be given access to public enterprise revolving
funds, guaranteed or low interest loans, or credit subsidies from the federal
43. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
44. While individual government corporations are usually allowed to organize their own accounting and management systems, the Government Corporations Control Act, supra note 8, does require
the corporations, whether wholly or partially government-owned, to be subjected to GAO audits at
least once every 3 years, and to make specified annual reports to Congress. The Tennessee Valley
Authority was specifically exempted from some provisions, such as the ability of GAO to disallow
expenditures, so there is precedent for modifying these relationships and specifications by specific
legislation, but it has rarely been done.
45. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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government.' While the financial objective of the corporation would not
necessarily be to maximize profit, there would be a requirement to manage
the corporate assets so as to earn at least a public utility level rate-ofreturn on the land resources under its control.4 7 This performance standard
could take the form of an annual rent on land and timber resources to be
paid into the federal treasury each year.
A major issue involves the disposition of net income from public corporation operations, and transition from the present policy of sharing
gross revenues with local governments. Under this proposal, income
would be split four ways: (a) an amount equal to eight percent of the
market value of land and timber is paid to the federal government as an
annual rent; (b) a specified fixed percentage paid into a revolving fund
to support wilderness management and/or wildland research;48 (c) an
amount not to exceed fifty percent of the balance to be earmarked for
new investments; and (d) remaining income to be distributed to local
governments under policies established by the Public Corporations Board.
Under this arrangement, sums paid to local government probably would
decline, because the amount would be based on a floating percentage
share of net income rather than on a percentage share of gross revenue.
As an offset, public corporations could make payments to local governments in lieu of local property taxes.49 The sharing formula could be
implemented so that, in the transition period, revenues from the public
corporation gradually decrease (or increase) to the amount that would be
sustained under the income distrubution-plus-payment in lieu of property
taxes.
Actions of PFCs would be subject to environmental impact statements
(EIS)," ° but there would be no requirement that they prepare comprehensive land management plans, with the accompanying EIS, as under
the present arrangement. Certain actions which are part of long-term
programs, such as timber harvests or sales, however, could be subject to
programmatic environmental impact statements. Clean air5 and water,52
46. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
48. This might ease some of the important opposition to the proposal, since it would give these
activities a more secure source of funding than year-to-year appropriations, and would give those
interest groups a vested interest in making the corporation a profitable operation. At least the research
activities could find a precedent in the research and development work performed under TVA funding.
See Wirtz, supra note 7.
49. Similar payments are made by TVA to local governments. WALSH, supra note 12, and Wirtz,
supra note 7.
50. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-61 (1976).
51. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1976).
52. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1972), and
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977).
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endangered species,53 and wild rivers54 legislation would also continue to
be applicable.
ADVANTAGES
The primary advantage of a PFC approach to federal land management
lies in the potential for achieving greater efficiency in the utilization of
the land, capital, and labor. Greater efficiency could result from the
incentive to carefully balance benefits against costs in making production
and land use decisions. Activities which do not pay their way, including
the cost of capital, would not normally be undertaken, unless an outside
agency or private organization intervenes with proposals to finance the
activity. The decentralization of the decisionmaking and planning structure to single, independent, relatively small-sized units,5 5 moreover, should
be more responsive to change in public demand for its outputs than the
present bureaucratic structure.5 6 Finally, the capacity to raise any amount
of capital necessary to invest in projects and programs yielding returns
at or greater than the cost of the same funds will also aid greater efficiency
and productivity. 7
A second advantage stems from the potential stabilization of the personnel involved in managing federal lands. While there undoubtedly
would be movement of individuals from one PFC to another in response
to opportunities for advancement to higher paying positions, turnover
would not be as high as under present federal personnel policies and
probably a whole lot lower. A positive program of advancement, more
flexible job classifications, professional training, and above all, countering outside bids with higher salary, would enable a PFC to develop a
more stable force of field technicians, professional staff, and executive
level managers. Greater continuity in management direction, development
53. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976).
54. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1976).
55. "The outstanding characteristic of autonomy is the possibility of flexible, adaptable, selfdirected operation within a broad field of responsibility and authority without detailed, rigid prescription laid down in advance or currently by the executive or legislative branches of the government." Duffus, The Place of the Government Corporationin the Public Utility Industries, 25 LAND
ECON. 29-32 (1949).
56. Although no one is claiming it to be an inherent property of government corporations, it has
been observed that autonomous corporations do tend to become conservative and quite resistant to
change as they mature in their corporate life cycle, although perhaps not reaching the bureaucratic
extreme of some government agencies. WALSH, supra note 12; SHEPHERD, PuBLic ENTERPRISE:
ECONOmIC ANALYSIS OF THEORY AND PRAcTIcE (1976); Hobbs, supra note 9.
57. Without government subsidy, the minimum rate of return for capital investments would
correspond to the interest rate payable on bonds or loans. Some observers have noted that tax-free
bonds or low-interest loans have a tendency, however, to depress the cost of capital to an artificially
low level, thereby encouraging overcapitalization. See WALSH, supranote 12, and SHPrHR,
supra
note 56.
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of greater in-house expertise on how the resource base is responding to
management inputs, and continuous in-house accountability for the results
of decisions would result from implementation of the PFC. Top-level
management of a PFC would serve at the pleasure of the board of directors, and all employees would be exempt from normal civil service regulations. In order for a PFC to attract Forest Service personnel, however,
there would have to be some type of security, at least for levels GS-15
and below, comparable to their present civil service status.
A third advantage is that federal land management would become less
vulnerable to the politics of special interest groups and more responsive
to the dollar votes of consumers in the marketplace. This stems from the
decentralization of decisionmaking and control; the substitution of financial performance standards for political direction from Congress and the
administrative hierarchy; and the opportunities any interest group has to
acquire access to services by buying them direct from the corporation or
by leasing lands.
DISADVANTAGES
The drawbacks to a PFC system with strong emphasis on economic
efficiency involve two types of consideration: (1) the usual objections to
using economic efficiency criteria as a basis for public land management;
and (2) shortcomings of the specific proposal outlined here. All the alleged
shortcomings of economic efficiency attributed to private enterprise in
the management of forest resources need not be repeated here. Arguments
against using economic efficiency as a basis for public land management
center on notions that resources will be destroyed, or at best seriously
impaired, by basing decisions on profit criteria; that the needs of future
generations will be ignored; and that nonmarket values are not adequately
supplied. Yet, all these things have also been said about present federal
land management. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that a PFC approach
would be less effective in securing these public benefits than the present
system. Indeed, the various elements of the proposal are designed to
assure that these ends are reached and that at the same time greater
efficiency is also achieved.
As for the proposal itself, several disadvantages, or drawbacks, can
be identified:
1. A national policy could not be affected readily through a series
of independent PFC because these would be free to pursue their own
production policies subject to whatever incentives the federal govemnment might provide through financing or other arrangements. The
President, for example, could not raise or decrease the level of timber
harvest by executive order.
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2. There would be no necessary uniformity in the kind of land
management policies followed by the various corporations, compared
to the present situation where, at least in theory, each National Forest
operates under similar direction and standards. Of course, substantial
public interest in having uniformity on some particular policy or
practice could be mandated by the Public Forest Corporation Board.
Beyond that, each PFC would be encouraged to go its own way as
part of deliberate policy to encourage flexibility and innovation in
responding to public wants.
3. While in theory a PFC would be free of the financial constraints
imposed by Congress or the President, its capacity to raise funds at
costs equal to or less than the comparatively low rates of return
historically associated with the federal lands may, in fact, be severely
limited, particularly if interest rates remain at the relatively high
levels of recent years. Put another way, if forced to fund federal and
land management by private borrowing, less money, rather than
more, may be available for operations and new investments. As a
result, output and productivity may decline.
In response, a new economic era for the federal lands is in prospect,
and many lines of investment that previously were submarginal will become supramarginal. Moreover, if a large private corporation can justify
investments in growing forests, a large public corporation, particularly
one which can issue tax-free bonds and which is not subjected to corporate
taxes,58 should have even greater incentive. This ability to raise inexpensive capital has led some government corporations to over-invest in
capital improvements, and to emphasize corporate activities favored by
bond-market investors.5 9 Care must be taken to ensure that the government
corporation, buffered from politics by autonomy and from the market by
financial advantages, does not get too caught up in its own internal politics
or the preferences of investment bankers.
A TEST
A system of public forest corporations,-operating under the supervision
of a Public Forest Corporations Board, is one of several alternatives to
the present method for managing the federal lands. Obviously many more
details need to be developed before the proposal can be fully evaluated.
The intent of this article is to stimulate serious study of a potentially
promising way of achieving more effective management of federal lands.
As a way of testing the proposal, consideration could be given to
designating a portion of the federal lands, maybe twenty-five percent,
58. Virtually all public corporations are exempt from normal corporation taxes. WAISH, supra
note 12.
59. Id.
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including national forests, for management by public corporations. These
federal lands could be selected to represent a range of ecological and
economic conditions. An experiment would then be conducted in which
the performance of the public corporations is compared to the performance
of a comparable federal agency operation. Performance would be measured in terms of such variables as costs of operation, net revenues, rate
of return on investment, changes in productivity of the land base, environmental protection, differences in the multiple-use mix, levels of investment, and public attitudes. The experiment would yield valuable
information about the comparative performance of alternative institutional
arrangements for managing the federal lands, and would also provide an
element of competition in federal land management that does not now
exist. The PFCs would be eager to prove their merit (providing proper
incentives are instilled) and, correspondingly, the federal agency units
would be eager to prove their superiority. Because lack of competition
is a well known cause of economic inefficiency, a more varied, less
centralized and monopolistic style of management might lead to innovations that would otherwise not be iealized.

